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PRIMARY JURISDICTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR LIMITING DEFERRAL
Primary jurisdiction is a doctrine that was created to resolve the
jurisdictional dilemmas resulting when original jurisdiction over certain
questions resides in both a court and an administrative agency.' The
doctrine developed within the context of rate regulation and antitrust
litigation.2 More recently, primary jurisdiction has been applied to
environmental controversies. This note analyzes the extent to which
traditional notions of primary jurisdiction are suitable in the environ-
mental context and evaluates judicial application of the doctrine in this
area.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
Primary jurisdiction had its inception in Texas & Pacific Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co.' The Interstate Commerce Act4 provides that
charges for interstate shipments be at just and reasonable rates.' Abi-
lene alleged that the railway charged more than a just and reasonable
rate and sued to -ecover the excess charges. The railway argued that
the district court could not hear the case because the Interstate Commerce
Commission had not yet determined whether the rates were reasonable
and because such a determination was necessary under the Interstate Com-
merce Act.6 Justice White, writing for the Court, said:
1. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction should not be confused with the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies. Primary jurisdiction arises when a claim is originally
cognizable in a court and determines who should make the initial decision. Exhaustion
arises from a claim originally cognizable in an agency and governs the timing of
judicial review. See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1901, at 2 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as DAvIs].
The question of primary jurisdiction is also distinguishable from the question ofjurisdiction per se. In a case involving primary jurisdiction it is given that the court
has original jurisdiction. The challenge raises only the question of whether the court
will retain its jurisdiction or defer to concurrent agency jurisdiction. Id. at 3.
The procedure of judicial deference to an agency can take one of two possible
forms. A court may defer certain questions to an agency but retain jurisdiction
over the cause of action, or a court may dismiss the action. In the latter case, the
opportunity for subsequent judicial review of the agency decision may exist. Id.
2. See Convisser, Prinary Jurisdiction: Tlw Ride and Its Rationalizations, 65
YALE L.J. 315 (1956) ; Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 1037 (1964);
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
577 (1954).
3. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
4. Interstate Commerce Act ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§3 1-27 (1970).
5. Interstate Commerce Act § 1, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1(5) (1970).
6. Interstate Commerce Act § 15, ch. 104, § 15, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended,
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[I] f without previous action by the commission, power might
be exerted by courts and juries generally to determine the
reasonableness of an established rate, it would follow that unless
all courts reached an identical conclusion a uniform standard of
rates in the future would be impossible, as the standard would
fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions
reached as to reasonableness by the various courts called upon to
consider the subject as an original question.7
Thus, the clash of concurrent jurisdiction was resolved giving the agency
primary jurisdiction predicated on the necessity for uniform rate regu-
lation.
Uniformity remained the basis of primary jurisdiction until 1922
when the Supreme Court decided Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants
Elevator Co.' The action was brought by the elevator company, the
shipper, to recover charges made in violation of the carrier's tariff.' The
validity of the charges turned upon whether the body of the railway's
tariff rule or its exception applied.1" The carrier asserted that the extra
charge was valid under the exception and, further, that the district court
lacked jurisdiction until the Interstate Commerce Commission construed
the tariff. The carrier's argument for I.C.C. jurisdiction was based upon
49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1970).
7. 204 U.S. at 440.
8. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
9. For definitions and discussions of tariffs see Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cackette, 8
F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1925); Bernard v. United States Aircoach, 117 F. Supp. 134,
138 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Cushman, 92 Tex. 623, 624-25, 50
S.W. 1009, 1010 (1899); 49 U.S.C. § 6(1) (1970). See generally 83 C.J.S. Tariffs(1953).
10. 259 U.S. at 289. Rule 10 of the carrier's tariff read:
Diversion or reconsignment to points outside switching limits before
placement: If a car is diverted, reconsigned, or reforwarded on orders placed
with the local freight agent or other designated officer after arrival of car
at original destination, but before placement of unloading, . . . a charge of
$5.00 per car will be made if car is diverted, reconsigned, or reforwarded to
a point outside switching limits of original destination.
259 U.S. at 289.
The exception known as exception (a), as amended by supplement 1, provided that
rules (including Rule 10) shall not apply to:
(a) Grain, seed (field), seed (grass), hay or straw, carloads, held in cars
on track for inspection and disposition orders incident thereto at billed destin-
ation or at point intermediate thereto.
Id. The lower courts held that the exception meant
cars of grain are exempted from Rule 10 if held on track at billed destination
for inspection and for 'disposition orders' incident to such inspection [and] the
disposition order may be an order to make disposition by way of reconsignment
to another destination . ...
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uniformity.' However, justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, refused
to decide on that ground, denying that in all circumstances uniformity
could be attained only through preliminary resort to the Commission:
Every question of the construction of a tariff is deemed a ques-
tion of law; and where the question concerns an interstate tariff
it is one of federal law. If the parties properly reserve their
rights, a construction given by any court, whether it be federal
or state, may ultimately be reviewed by this court .either on writ
of error or on writ of certiorari; and thereby uniformity in con-
struction may be secured."
A new basis of primary jurisdiction stressing the distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact was applied. The resolution of a
question of law was held to be a matter for the courts. It was recognized
that the resolution of questions of fact raising complex technical issues
or involving standards of future practice requires preliminary resort to
an administrative agency. Since the Court deemed the construction of a
tariff to be a question of law, the Interstate Commerce Commission was
not given primary jurisdiction. The lesson of this case is that primary
jurisdiction may be used by a court as a discretionary device to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction in deference to agency expertise.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITi DEFERRAL
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT
The policies and standards developed in these early cases were de-
signed to delineate the situations warranting deferral." However, two
aspects of present day litigation demonstrate that current guidelines for
primary jurisdiction are generally inadequate and are particularly ill-
suited to environmental controversies. First, courts have sometimes
strictly adhered to these guidelines, 4 but at other times have given them
only cursory consideration.'5 As a result, many marginal cases are de-
ferred where there is little real advantage from agency consideration of
issues."8 One possible explanation for this result is that the boundaries
of judicial discretion to defer are not sufficiently defined. Second, the
question of deferral in environmental controversies involves identifica-
11. Id. at 290.
12. Id. at 290-91.
13. Professor Davis discusses in detail these policies and their development in
3 DAvis, supra note 1, § 19.01, at 1-7.
14. E.g., New Mexico v. Arizona Public Service Co., 5 E.R.C. 1385 (Sup. Ct.
N.M. 1973); Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. State, 456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970).
15. See Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
16. See note 14 supra.
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tion and analysis of many interrelated factors, only one of which is factual
complexity. By concentrating on "complexity," the present test ignores
numerous other considerations vital to the issue of primary jurisdiction
in environmental disputes. As a result of these inadequacies, a neea
emerges for a revised standard for primary jurisdiction in environmental
cases.
On a broad level, the problem of primary jurisdiction raises the
question of who is the better decisionmaker, i.e., which institution, court
or agency, is better equipped and more suited to resolve certain types of
problems.17 In the midst of the currently popular debate over this ques-
tion, many arguments have been raised which apply generally to all ques-
tions of agency versus court competence. In the enviroumental context,
much of this discussion takes on unique significance.
Many arguments are available in support of deferring to agencies on
environmental issues. First, environmental decisions, probably more
than any other area of the law, have wide-reaching ramifications, both
for present day living conditions and, particularly, for the living condi-
tions of future generations."8 Traditionally, courts confine themselves
to decisions on the particular issues at hand, binding only parties before
the court, and based largely on past facts. Agencies, on the other hand,
have an inherent "planning" function which looks to the future and con-
siders an individual case within the broad scheme of implementing a legis-
latively determined goal-policy. Second, some argue that to. be truly
effective, enviroumental regulations demand uniform formulation and ap-
plication." Repeatedly in recent times Congress has been urged to set
forth a clear policy for the environment." The National Environmental
17. An interesting approach for resolving this apparent conflict has been adopted
by California.
No provision of this . . . [act) or any ruling [of the agency] is a
limitation: . . . (e) on the right of any person to maintain at any time
any appropriate action for relief against any private nuisance as defined in the
Civil Code [§§ 3479-81] or for relief against contamination or pollution.
CAL. WATER CODE § 13002 (West 1969). To the extent that primary jurisdiction is
a limitation on the right to maintain an action for relief from pollution, this provision
could be interpreted as abolishing primary jurisdiction in California.
An alternative approach would be to provide for exclusive agency jurisdiction.
Both approaches are extreme. Therefore, a decision favoring one approach over the
other is one of policy for a legislature. However, in the absence of a legislative deter-
mination, a court confronted with primary jurisdiction issues must decide for itself
who is the better decisionmaker.
18. Environmental decisions are often irreversible; therefore, any decision that
may affect future generations must be made with extreme caution, following a thorough
investigation.
19. Hickel, Administrative Law and the Envirownent: National Fuels Policy-
Preface, 47 IND. L.J. 603-04 (1972).
20. Id.; Caldwell, A National Policy for Energy, 47 IND. L.J. 624-25 (1972).
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Policy Act seems a definite step in this direction.2' Piecemeal judicial
determinations may frustrate this attempt to achieve uniformity.22 Lastly,
environmental questions often involve a high degree of technical com-
plexity which may demand more familiarity and expertise than a court
can offer.
Despite their initial appeal, these arguments are faulty and unper-
suasive. Probably their most glaring defect is that, until now, agencies
have simply not done the job of protecting the environment.2" Some
predicate this failure on the so-called "capture" theory which dictates
that agencies are politically controlled by the very industries they were
designed to regulate." Even if "capture" is too strong a term, it must
be admitted that agencies are subject to such political and economic pres-
sures25 that there is a "need to maintain some sort of politically balanced
position among the constituencies with which [an administrator]
regularly deals."2 This need works to compromise the public interest. 7
A court, on the other hand, is relatively independent of political and
economic pressures in hearing and deciding an environmental controversy.
In addition to political pressures, agencies are unresponsive to the
pubic interest because they, like all bureaucracies, "tend to become some-
what ingrown, attached to their own concepts of policy . . .." In the
environmental context, this inflexibility and "insider perspective"" is
undesirable in the sense that no agency solution or plan is sufficiently
perfect so as to never warrant modification. A court, however, is not
subject to the factor of "insider perspective." Rather, "the very diversity
21. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
See also Tarlock, Balancing Environinental Considerations and Energy Demands: A
Comment on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comnittee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645,
657-70 (1972).
22. Regulations set by environmental agencies will obtain little success if polluters
realize that, despite compliance, they are still vulnerable to a damaging lawsuit, based
on judicial standards stricter than the administrative guidelines. See generally Note,
Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions, 79 YALE L.. 102, 107-09
(1970).
23. Tarlock, Book Review, 47 IND. L.J. 406, 415 (1972).
24. Jaffe, The Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Administrative
Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 565, 565-66 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Jaffe].
25. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITZENS AcrTio
56 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SAX].
26. Id. at 110.
27. Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BuT. L.
Rzv. 231, 235 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Control].
EitherL because [the agencies] are unduly responsive to special interests or
have become insulated from their constituencies, the agencies in many cases do
not adequately reflect the interests of unrepresented or unorganized groups.
Id.
28. Jaffe, supra note 24, at 569.
29. SAX, supra note 25, at 56.
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of the judicial role and the large numbers of judges among whom . . .
[environmental] cases will be divided" 30 negates the possibility of unim-
aginative and unvarying decisions.
Whatever the rationale for administrative failure, it is apparent that
courts, not agencies, have led the way in environmental protection."'
Notable accomplishments, particularly in requiring a fuller administra-
tive record and expanding standing to sue, have been achieved. 2 More-
over, courts have proven themselves capable of contributing significantly
to the planning process. Courts cannot engage in large-scale planning.
However, by inquiring into national and state policy, "the courts help
promote the sort of continuous review and reevaluation that any large
scale program needs. . .. ""
A complement to judicial activism is the emergence of citizen par-
ticipation as an effective tool in policing the environment. Congress, 4
and the courts,3" spurred on by the commentators,36 have given explicit
recognition to the need for public participation at all levels of environ-
mental decisionmaking. Such participation is considered vital to properly
express and protect the public interest.1
7
If citizen participation is to be favored, legal doctrines which impose
burdens on that participation should, it seems, be narrowly limited in their
application. Primary jurisdiction, as presently applied, potentially en-
genders unnecessary burdens of expense and delay"8 for the citizen
litigant. Most public interest groups and individuals engaged in environ-
mental litigation are ill-equipped financially to withstand the hardships
of deferral. Moreover, the broad health, aesthetic and economic interests
of the general public may be adversely affected or irreparably injured
while the case is shuttled from court to agency.39
30. Id. at 109.
31. Jaffe, supra note 24, at 568.
32. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
33. SAx, supra note 25, at 154.
34. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
35. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
36. SAx, supra note 25; Environmental Control, stpra note 27; Ruckelshaus,
The CitL-en and the Environmental Regulatory Process, 47 IND. I.J. 636 (1972);
Note, Public Interest Right to Participate in Federal Administrative Agency Proceed-
ings: Scope and Effect, 47 IrND. L.J. 682 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note].
37. Note, supra note 36, at 688.
38. Schwartz, Primary Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of Litigants, 41 GEo. L.J.
495 (1953). This article focuses on the problem of delay as an undesirable consequence
of the misapplication of primary jurisdiction.
39. Defendants in these actions are often large corporations and there may be a
great disparity in the economic resources available to each of the parties. This might
make it impossible for the plaintiff to bear the expense of protracted agency action
and judicial review. This may be contrasted with those situations where a state
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The foregoing considerations indicate that the analysis required to
resolve a primary jurisdiction question is exceedingly complex. There
may be considerable adverse consequences associated with deferral. Yet,
these are justified in cases where there is a legitimate need for agency
expertise and planning. However, it is difficult for a court to distinguish
such cases from those where injury to the interests of plaintiffs and the
public outweighs the utility of deferral. This distinction is made even
more difficult by the fact that the burdens of deferral are imposed not at
the urging of the administrative agency, the public or the plaintiff, but
rather at the urging of a defendant asserting an affirmative defense. Thus,
a misapplication of primary jurisdiction represents a decision in favor
of a defendant's interests. In order to achieve a desirable balance be-
tween the adverse effects of deferral and the utility of primary jurisdiction
in environmental controversies new guidelines must be devised to
narrowly define the limits of the application of primary jurisdiction.
PROPOSED GUIDELINES
The doctrine as it presently exists recognizes that questions of law
are for the court and utilizes complexity as the standard to determine
what factual questions should be deferred. However, since courts
regularly resolve some complex questions of fact,4" complexity alone
should not be the sole criterion for judicial deference, but only the initial
standard that must be met. Beyond this, the state of agency involvemrnt
in the problem must be considered.
If the agency has not yet studied the problem, courts should not
defer. In the absence of agency planning, this conclusion prevents un-
necessary expense and delay to the litigants, as well as potentially evoking
a legislative or administrative response in terms of future planning.
Similarly, if the agency has already studied the problem, courts should
not defer. Rather, the court should hear the matter relying on the re-
sults of agency planning and investigation. Otherwise the agency would
be required to repeat and duplicate its efforts at the expense of the liti-
gants. Deferral of a complex factual issue is warranted only when the
agency is in the process of considering the problem.4 ' This result ac-
commodates the need for planning and reduces the possibility of un-
attorney general initiates an action on behalf of a state environmental agency and
with antitrust or rate regulation litigation where the economic disparity between parties
is not so apparent.
40. For example, courts may use masters to resolve complex factual problems.
See 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 513-28 (1953).
41. Such simultaneous consideration may occur when the agency is involved in
setting standards or is investigating a particular problem looking to the possibility
of an enforcement action.
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necessary expense and delay.
These guidelines reduce the potential for irreparable harm, encour-
age citizen participation by minimizing the undesirable consequences of
expense and delay, and protect the interests of the public. At the same
time courts are not required to duplicate agency work already in progress,
thereby resulting in a workable allocation of functions between courts
and agencies. Also, uniformity is preserved since, under this model,
courts would not be setting standards inconsistent with agency guide-
lines. Finally, the range of judicial discretion is narrowed, thereby avoid-
ing deferral of the marginal cases.
ANALYSIS OF COURT USE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
AND APPLICATION OF PROPOSED GUIDELINES
A recent environmental case involving primary jurisdiction is White
Lake Improvement Association v. City of Whitehall." This was a
nuisance action in which the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the
municipality for the discharge of improperly treated sewage into White
Lake. The court denied that the Water Resources Commission had ex-
clusive jurisdiction to provide relief against municipalities. It found that
the Act establishing the Commission43 did not abrogate existing common
law remedies." ' The court resolved the concurrent jurisdiction problem
by applying primary jurisdiction, saying:
To rule on the plaintiff's cause of action would require a court
to duplicate the efforts of the water resources commission ...
In order to achieve uniformity and consistency in this vital area,
we think it would be wise for the courts to refrain from ruling
on the merits of the association's claims at this time."'
The court denied injunctive relief and dismissed the suit, suggesting that
[t]he association may administratively challenge the water
resources commission's orders and then, if dissatisfied with the
commission's disposition of its claims, it can obtain judicial
review through the administrative procedure act.46
The court's analysis is problematic for two reasons. First, it is
questionable whether an agency can always produce more consistent and
42. 22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
43. Water Resources Commission Act, MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 323.1-.12(a)
(1949).
44. 22 Mfich. App. at -, 177 N.W.2d at 478-79.
45. Id. at -, 177 N.W.2d at 482.
46. Id.
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uniform results than a court in a given set of circumstances." Therefore,
the need for consistency and uniformity should not necessarily lead a court
to apply primary jurisdiction. Second, it indicates a departure from the
complexity test. If that test had been applied in this case, the court might
have retained jurisdiction and decided the case under either a state statute
or the common law.48 Under the statute, the only question of fact would
be whether there was a discharge at all."5 If the case were heard as a
nuisance action the court would have to balance the harm from the dis-
charges against the harm from issuing an equitable decree. Under either
theory of action the factual inquiries involved would be the kind that a
common law court is accustomed to making.
Admittedly, however, an injunction against a municipality may in-
volve more complex considerations than an action against a corporate
defendant." Therefore, the court's application of primary jurisdiction
may have been appropriate because subsequent to the plaintiff's complaint
in this action, the Water Resources Commission entered into an agree-
ment with the city under which an improved sewage treatment facility
would be completed."' The existence of the agreement gives an indica-
tion that the Commission was considering the very issue raised in the
lawsuit. Hence, on these facts it appears that the invocation of primary
jurisdiction was warranted under the guidelines set out in this note.
In Wisconsin v. Dairyland Power Cooperative,2 the plaintiff sought
47. See note 12 supra.
48. The Water Resources Commission Act provides that:
The discharge of any raw sewage of human origin, directly or indirectly,
into any of the waters of the state shall be considered prima facie evidence
of the violation of section 6(a) of this act unless said discharge shall have
been permitted by an order, rule or regulation of the Commission. Any city,
village or township which permits, allows or suffers the discharge of such
raw sewage of human origin into any of the waters of the state by any of
its inhabitants or persons occupying lands from which said raw sewage
originates, shall be subject only to the remedies provided for in section 7
of this act.
MIcH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 323.6(b) (1949).
The court inquired whether municipalities were subject to actions under this statute
or whether only landowners in the municipality were covered. No answer was given to
this question, but the court clearly stated that even if municipalities were not covered
by the act they were still subject to common law liabilities. 22 Mich. App. at -, 177
N.W.2d at 478.
49. The statute makes any dischaige prima facie evidence of a violation. MIcH.
Co p. LAws ANN. § 323.6(b) (1949).
50. In addition to the economic consequences of an injunction, a court would have
to consider the health hazards produced by enjoining a municipality's sewage treatment
facilities, the state of technology, and the availability of alternative methods of
treatment. In sum, the problem is whether a municipality's sewage treatment facilities
could ever be enjoined.
51. 22 Mich. App. at - , 177 N.W.2d at 475.
52. 52 Wis. 2d 45, 187 N.W.2d 878 (1971).
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abatement of defendant's power plant as a public nuisance alleging that it
emitted fumes, smoke, gases, soot and other particles in such quantity
as to threaten the public health. The defendant demurred on the ground
that the State Department of Natural Resources had primary jurisdiction.
The trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant appealed. The
appellate court discussed whether it could adequately consider the facts
before it:
A substantial portion of appellant's brief is devoted to an exposi-
tion of the complex nature of the pollution problem and the
technological difficulties involved in discovering methods of
abating the particular kind of pollution appellant is charged with
emitting. Appellant contends that there is no way, given the
present state of the science, that it can effect substantial reduc-
tions in the emissions of sulphur oxides and still continue to
operate. If that is true, then the fact questions in this case are
relatively simple. 3
The court did not explain any of the facts concerning the state of pollu-
tion abatement technology. This omission makes impossible a detailed
analysis of the complexity of this particular problem. However, defen-
dant's allegations raise the spectre of complexity, especially since the
plaintiff-appellees made no admissions on the "impossibility" issue. Even
though the court in approaching the complexity issue should have engaged
in a deeper analysis of the problem, the denial of primary jurisdiction in
this case was appropriate since there was no simultaneous agency con-
sideration. 4
Two recent cases that exemplify proper application of primary juris-
diction are Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. State" and New Mexico
v. Arizona Public Service Co."6
In Houston Compressed Steel, the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant was violating the Clean Air Act5" by outdoor burning of wood from
old boxcars. The Texas Air Control Board had not granted the defen-
dant a variance nor did the defendant come within an exception to the
Board's regulatons. The trial court granted a temporary injunction, and
on appeal the defendant presented several points of error, one of which
was that primary jurisdiction should have been invoked. The Texas
53. Id. at 56, 187 N.W.2d 883-84.
54. See note 40 supra & text accompanying.
55. 456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
56. 5 E.R.C. 1385 (Sup. Ct. N.M.1973).
57. TEx. RE:v. Crv. STAT. ANx. art. 4477-5 (1971). Pursuant to § 3.09(a)
and § 3.10(c) of the Act, the Texas Air Control Board had passed Regulation II,
which limited outdoor burning to specifically named purposes. 456 S.W.2d at 771.
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Apellate Court affirmed the trial court and rejected the contention that
this was an appropriate case for the application of primary jurisdiction."
The court strictly applied the law-fact test finding:
There was little, if any, dispute as to the facts for determination
by the trial court in the instant case: did the appellants come
within an exception to the prohibition against outdoor burning
or had they obtained a variance from the Board? Neither ques-
tion involved "technical and intricate matters of fact" . . I
If the Texas Air Control Board had been in the process of developing a
regulation with respect to outdoor burning, or if the Board had been in
the process of granting a variance to the defendant, then the resolution
of the factual issues before the court would not have been so simple. In
such a situation, the court could properly defer to prevent an inefficient
allocation of functions because the court would have to duplicate the
agency's extensive evaluation of scientific data to detemine the harmful
effects of outdoor burning. However, that was not the situation in this
case for the Board had already promulgated regulations and was not con-
sidering an application for a variance. Therefore, as the court noted, the
factual issues of whether the defendant's activity violated the law was
relatively simple. It is the type of question courts must answer in almost
every case.
The second case, New Mexico v. Arizona Public Service Co.,60 was
a public nuisance action to enjoin emissions of several substances, in-
cluding mercury, from five coal burning power plants. The defendants,
electric utility companies, moved to dismiss on several grounds, one of
which was primary jurisdiction. The trial court denied application of
primary jurisdiction, finding that its expertise was sufficient to deter-
mine all factual questions involved.6 However, the trial court did re-
coguize that the question of excessive emissions was also within the pur-
view of tie State Environmental Improvement Agency, 2 but noted that
the Agency had not yet established regulations proscribing the components
58. 456 S.W.2d at 771.
59. Id. at 772.
60. 5 E.R.C. 1385 (Sup. Ct. N.M. 1973).
61. The court said: "No personal expertise is required of the court or its staff
in any of the fields to reach findings of fact" State v. Arizona Public Service Co., 3
E.R.C. 1617, 1620 (Dist. Ct. San Juan City, N.M. 1972).
It was also noted:
That the Court might have to administer its decree should it impose one
is no deterrent to its affording relief if proper. Masters, receivers and
marshalls or sheriffs are the traditional arms of the Court when appropriate.
Id.
62. N.M. STAT. AxN. § 12-19-4 (1971).
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of the defendant's smokestack emissions."3 Upon the facts recognized by
this court, the refusal to apply primary jurisdiction was proper. 4
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court
refusing to dismiss the complaint.65 The Supreme Court took a different
view of the facts. Although the Agency had not established proscriptive
regulations, the court considered that
[t]he affadavits establish that the agency has been and is pre-
sently engaged in research study and investigation of mercury,
the contaminate identified in the fourth claim of the complaint,
and that it will propose the adoption of a regulation governing
the emission of mercury if the results of the studies indicate the
need therefor."
Because the Agency was proceeding with a determination of the factual
issues involved in the case, the court properly applied primary jurisdic-
tion."
63. 3 E.R.C. at 1619.
64. If that agency could equally afford the relief sought and was going forward
with such a determination, then there might be good reason for the court to
defer until the agency r'esults could be viewed. This would thus prevent the
court from launching into an inquiry for which the agency might be better
equipped.
Id. at 1620.
65. 5 E.R.C. at 1390.
66. Id. at 1388.
67. The guidelines proposed in this note will be of no use to a court if there is
no real primary jurisdiction issue. An example of such a case is Ellison v. Rayonier
Inc., 156 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Wash. 1957). Plaintiffs sought to recover losses from
their oyster bed operation allegedly caused by water pollution from defendant's pulp
mills. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the Pollution Control
Commission had exclusive jurisdiction. However, it was held that the common law
right to damages had not been abolished. Consequently there was a situation of con-
current jurisdiction.
In his opinion, judge Boldt discussed the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, but
did not indicate how he would have decided that issue. He noted that the plaintiffs
failed to make any allegations of standards set by the State Water Pollution Control
Commission or action taken by the Commission to abate or control the pollution of
which the plaintiffs complained. He further stated that
dismissal of the complaints will not be granted pending application for their
amendment by allegations concerning administrative action warranting further
judicial process in this court.
Id. at 220. Thus, the result appeared to be premised on the plaintiffs failure to plead
properly, rather than on an application of primary jurisdiction.
Seven years later in Olympia Oyster Co. v. Rayonier Inc., 229 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.
Wash. 1964), Judge Boldt was confronted with the Ellison case only under a different
name. He wrote: "This case is one of a group of related cases to which the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction was held applicable in Ellison v. Rayonier Incorp."
Id. at 856. Surprisingly, one learned that Judge Boldt felt that he had applied primary
jurisdiction in Ellison, though that opinion gave no indication that primary jurisdiction
was the basis of the decision. The rationale for applying the doctrine was that
[u]nder primary administrative jurisdiction principles held applicable in
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CONCLUSION
These last two cases demonstrate the benefits which result from
following the theoretical guidelines set forth in this note. The require-
ments of factual complexity and simultaneous agency evaluation lead to
the most efficient allocation of time and resources of both courts and
agencies. These requirements place an effective limit on deferral to
agencies which prevents a needless burden on the administrative process.
Yet deferral is permitted where these burdens are minimal and the
agency may be particularly well suited to contribute to the decisionmak-
ing process.
Most importantly, the proposed guidelines encourage citizen parti-
cipation in th± environmental decisionmaking process by limiting the
expense and delay of unnecessary deferral. If citizen participation is truly
the watchword of environmental protection, then these guidelines are
another step in achieving the ultimate goal of a clean environment.
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Ellison, plaintiff has the burden of proof to show one or more violations
of the permit conditions applicable to the operation of the Shelton Mill.
Id. at 858.
Ellison illustrates the extent to which primary jurisdiction can be misconceived.
There was no need to discuss primary jurisdiction. The court could have compelled
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 15 without reference
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The court invoked the doctrine as an indirect
means to accomplish a result that could have been reached directly.
